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UNDERSTANDING SOURCE
INCOMPATIBILISM
Neal A. Tognazzini
Abstract: Source incompatibilism is an increasingly popular version
of incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility.
However, many self-described source incompatibilists formulate the
thesis differently, resulting in conceptual confusion that can obscure
the relationship between source incompatibilism and other views in
the neighborhood. In this paper I canvas various formulations of the
thesis in the literature and argue in favor of one as the least likely to
lead to conceptual confusion. It turns out that accepting my formula-
tion has some surprising (but helpful) taxonomical consequences.
Recently, many incompatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility
have begun calling themselves ‘source incompatibilists,’ mostly to distinguish
themselves from those incompatibilists who focus exclusively on whether
determinism rules out the infamous ability to do otherwise. But while those
who call themselves ‘source incompatibilists’ are united in the desire to distin-
guish themselves from the more traditional sort of incompatibilist, their thesis
cannot be understood merely in terms of what it is not. To understand source
incompatibilism fully, the thesis needs some positive content. And it is in the
attempt to formulate positive content where theorists divide. As a result, when
someone claims to be a source incompatibilist, one always has to ask the fol-
low-up question: “What do youmean by ‘source incompatibilism’?” before one
can understand the claim. This situation is less than ideal.
The aim of this essay is to eliminate the need for this follow-up question by
proposing a particular taxonomy that gives source incompatibilism a stable
positive content and also situates it within the neighborhood of incompatibilist
views. The central contention is that adopting the taxonomy proposed in this
paper will maximize conceptual clarity.
1 TWO POINTS OFCLARIFICATION
To begin, it’s important to make two points of clarification. First, incompati-
bilists (of any stripe) do not have a monopoly on the concept of sourcehood.
Indeed, any plausible theory of moral responsibility will include an account of
control that requires the agent in question to be the source, in some sense, of his
or her action. The following, then, is an utterly uncontroversial thesis:
Sourcehood An agent, S, is morally responsible for a particular
action, A, only if S is the source of A.
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Part of what makes it uncontroversial, though, is the fact that it remains neutral
with regard to any particular conception of sourcehood. Each theorist will have
his or her own opinion about how best to understand what’s involved in source-
hood.
A proponent of agent-causation, for instance, will understand sourcehood in
terms of an agent’s literally being the uncaused cause of his or her action (e.g.,
O’Connor 2000). A proponent of event-causal libertarianism will perhaps
understand sourcehood in terms of chaotically amplified indeterminacies cul-
minating in an indeterminate effort to make both of two mutually exclusive
choices (e.g., Kane 1996). A compatibilist may understand sourcehood in terms
of mechanism-ownership that comes about through a process of taking respon-
sibility for one’s mechanism (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998). But however
sourcehood is understood, all parties agree that it is required for moral responsi-
bility. Where they differ is with respect to what sourcehood consists in.
Any initial temptation to think that sourcehood is an exclusively incompati-
bilist notion comes from conflating sourcehood with what some incompati-
bilists have called ultimate sourcehood. Whereas an agent is the source of an
action insofar as the agent exercises some appropriate form of active control
over the action, in order for an agent to be the ultimate source of an action, the
agent must have control over certain other aspects of the world, too. For
instance, perhaps the agent must exercise control over any sufficient cause of
the action in question, as well as over the action itself. Or perhaps the agent
must exercise control over his or her character or personality. Whatever the
details, though, ultimate sourcehood is only one particular conception of the
more general concept of sourcehood, and the two shouldn’t be equated. We
shall return to this idea of ultimate sourcehood below, but for now let us merely
note that one need not think that sourcehood requires any sort of ultimacy. With
that in mind, let’s continue with our project of giving positive content to the
thesis of source incompatibilism.
2 FIVE FORMULATIONS OF SOURCE INCOMPATIBILISM
Let’s start by familiarizing ourselves with some of the more standard terminol-
ogy in the debate. Compatibilists and incompatibilists alike agree that source-
hood is required for moral responsibility, but they will disagree about
something, namely whether the following two theses are compatible:
(D) There is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.1
(M) Some people are on some occasions morally responsible for
their actions.
Incompatibilists will say that (D) and (M) could not both be true—this is what
makes them incompatibilists. Compatibilists will say that (D) and (M) could
1 A physically possible future is a way the world could unfold that is consistent both with the actual
past and the actual laws of nature. This statement of determinism is to some extent metaphorical, but
no less serviceable because of that. The statement of (D) is from Peter van Inwagen (1983, 3).
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both be true—this is what makes them compatibilists. Now, there are further
debates within each camp about the following principle (see Frankfurt 1969):
(PAP) An agent, A, is morally responsible for some particular
action, X, only if A had the ability to refrain from doing X.
Some compatibilists embrace (PAP); some don’t. Those that do have some-
times been called ‘traditional compatibilists’ (e.g., Lewis 1981); those that
don’t have sometimes been called ‘semi-compatibilists’ (e.g., Fischer 1994).2
Some incompatibilists embrace (PAP); some don’t. Those that do have some-
times been called ‘leeway incompatibilists’ (e.g., van Inwagen 1983); those that
don’t have sometimes been called ‘source incompatibilists’ (e.g., Stump 2003).
So we have arrived at one way of understanding the thesis of source incompati-
bilism: as the conjunction of incompatibilism with the denial of (PAP).
In one passage, Michael McKenna (2001, 40) seems to construe source
incompatibilism in this way:
[Source incompatibilists] agree with the semicompatibilists that the
Frankfurt examples succeed in showing that the freedom crucial for
moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities . . . But
unlike the semicompatibilists, these source incompatibilists maintain
that morally responsible agency requires a deterministic break in the
actual sequence of events that leads to an agent’s freely willed
action.3
And although he doesn’t use the term ‘source incompatibilism’ explicitly,
Randolph Clarke seems to be talking about the same view when he says:
“Another group of writers who accept Frankfurt’s argument nevertheless main-
tain that responsibility is incompatible with determinism” (Clarke 2003, 11). So
our first formulation of the thesis of source incompatibilism is as follows:
(SI-1) Incompatibilism is true and (PAP) is false.
This formulation captures what many people see as one of the defining features
of source incompatibilism: the contrast that it provides to the more traditional
sort of incompatibilism that is motivated by (PAP) together with the claim that
determinism would rule out the ability to do otherwise.
The next formulation can be distilled from the following passage from Derk
Pereboom (2008, 1):
I oppose a type of incompatibilism according to which the availabili-
ty of alternative possibilities is the most important factor for explain-
ing moral responsibility, and accept instead a variety that ascribes the
2 Officially, semi-compatibilism doesn’t assert that (PAP) is false. Rather, it simply asserts that (D)
and (M) are compatible whether or not determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. But the
most prominent semi-compatibilist—John Martin Fischer—is also a prominent defender of the
claim that (PAP) is false.
3 The term ‘source incompatibilism’ can be traced back to this paper, though the idea had been
around for much longer. You can see early hints of it in John Martin Fischer’s (1982) work.
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most significant explanatory role to the way in which the agent actu-
ally produces the action. In metaphysical terms, the sort of free will
required for moral responsibility does not consist most fundamentally
in the availability of alternative possibilities, but rather in the agent’s
being the causal source of her action in a specific way. Accordingly, I
advocate source as opposed to leeway incompatibilism.
This understanding of source incompatibilism is different from (SI-1). Rather
than having source incompatibilists by definition take an explicit stand on
whether (PAP) is true, as (SI-1) has it, Pereboom maintains that source incom-
patibilists are those incompatibilists who think that causal history is in some
sense more important to explaining moral responsibility than is the ability to do
otherwise. Let’s regiment this formulation of the thesis as follows:
(SI-2) Incompatibilism is true and (regardless of whether (PAP) is
true) the ability to refrain from doing X is not what plays the
most important role in explaining why A is responsible for
doing X—what plays the most important role is the causal
history of the action.
Some seem to think that an advantage of this formulation is that it allows us to
construct a parallel compatibilist position, as well. This position has been called
‘source compatibilism,’ and it is exactly the same as (SI-2) except that the first
conjunct is replaced with “Compatibilism is true” instead.4 Below we will consid-
er whether the alleged advantages of (SI-1) and (SI-2) are in fact advantageous.
The next formulation is found explicitly in the work of John Martin Fischer,
though apparently endorsed by others.5 In a section of one of his papers marked
‘Source Incompatibilism,’ Fischer writes:
Other philosophers have disagreed [with the view that causal deter-
mination in the actual sequence does not rule out moral responsibili-
ty], contending that causal determinism in the actual sequence rules
out moral responsibility “directly” (and not in virtue of expunging
alternative possibilities). (Fischer 2006, 201)
In this passage, Fischer appears to count any incompatibilist view that doesn’t
rely on the importance of the ability to do otherwise to establish incompatibil-
ism as a source incompatibilist view. Thus:
(SI-3) Incompatibilism is true, but not because determinism rules
out the ability to do otherwise.
4 Derk Pereboom, for example, uses the term ‘source compatibilism’ (see Pereboom 2006;
Pereboom 2008; Fischer, et al. 2007).
5 Something like this formulation is also found in Joseph Keim Campbell’s (2006) discussion of
source incompatibilism. A previous version of Campbell’s paper was presented at the 2006 Inland
Northwest Philosophy Conference under the name “Farwell to Source Incompatibilism.” Campbell
has since modified the name, perhaps to deal with some worries that plague the next formulation
discussed in the text. (Further discussion of the view can be found in Campbell’s [2011] book, espe-
cially ch. 4.)
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According to this formulation, there are different ways to argue for the thesis of
source incompatibilism. One might argue, for instance, that incompatibilism is
true because determinism would preclude the sort of self-creation that theorists
like Galen Strawson (1986) seem to think is required for moral responsibility. Or
one might argue that incompatibilism is true because some sort of Transfer of
Non-Responsibility principle is true, according to which if no one is responsible
for the fact that p and no one is responsible for the fact that p implies q, then no
one is responsible for the fact that q.6 All that is important, according to (SI-3), is
that the source incompatibilist not argue for incompatibilism via (PAP).
Note that (SI-3) is distinct from (SI-1), despite the fact that they both involve
some claim about (PAP). Whereas (SI-1) has it that the source incompatibilist is
committed to the falsity of (PAP), (SI-3) merely requires that the source incom-
patibilist not think (PAP) is part of the reason why determinism precludes
moral responsibility. It’s compatible with (SI-3), then, that some source incom-
patibilist could nevertheless think that (PAP) is true.
Whereas (SI-3) provides only information about something that does not
threaten moral responsibility, the fourth formulation takes a more positive
route. Consider the following quotation from Michael McKenna (2001, 40):
[Source incompatibilists] hold that the fundamental threat to moral
responsibility from determinism derives, not from the thought that in
a deterministic world an agent cannot do otherwise; it derives,
instead, from the thought that, if determinism is true, an agent’s
actions do not originate in her.
According to this formulation, source incompatibilism takes a stand not only on
what it is about determinism that threatens moral responsibility, but also on
what is the more fundamental threat from determinism. We can regiment this
formulation as follows:
(SI-4) Incompatibilism is true, and the fundamental reason it is true
is that determinism rules out origination—not that determin-
ism rules out the ability to do otherwise.
It is important to note that (SI-4) is distinct from (SI-2), despite the fact that
they both involve claims about importance or fundamentality. Whereas (SI-2)
states that the causal history of an action plays the more important role in
explaining some agent’s moral responsibility for that action, (SI-4) merely
states that facts about causal history constitute the fundamental reason that
determinism rules out moral responsibility. One is a claim about what explains
an agent’s moral responsibility; the other is a claim about why incompatibilism
is true.
Finally, a fifth formulation can be found in the following quotation from
Kevin Timpe (2007, 143):
6 Mark Ravizza (1994) has discussed such a Transfer Principle at length, and more discussion can
be found in his work with John Martin Fischer (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, ch. 6).
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At the heart of Source Incompatibilism is the claim that moral
responsibility requires that an agent is the ultimate source of that
action; and Source Incompatibilists think that the truth of causal
determinism would imply that no one would be the ultimate source of
her actions.7
Setting aside the adjective ‘ultimate’ for now (it will come up again later), we
can use Timpe’s quotation as the foundation for our fifth formulation of the
source incompatibilist thesis. Nothing is mentioned here about (PAP) one way
or the other, and nothing is mentioned about what plays the more important role
in explaining an agent’s moral responsibility or what is the more fundamental
reason determinism rules out moral responsibility.8 All that is mentioned is a
necessary condition for moral responsibility—sourcehood—and the idea that
determinism is incompatible with that necessary condition. We can regiment
this is as follows:
(SI-5) Incompatibilism is true because determinism rules out
sourcehood, which is required for moral responsibility.
These five formulations of the thesis may not be the only extant formulations,
but they do seem to represent those that have been most influential.
The claim is not that these formulations are mutually exclusive in the sense
that if one is true, the others are automatically false. It could very well be, for
instance, that someone accepts the truth of two or three of them. Rather, the
claim is that they are mutually exclusive in the sense that at most one can be the
best way to understand source incompatibilism. In what follows, I will argue
that the best formulation—and ‘best’ here means ‘least likely to lead to concep-
tual confusion’—is (SI-5). Understanding the thesis in this way, however, will
lead to some potentially surprising consequences about who should and should
not count as a source incompatibilist, and about the relationships between dis-
tinct varieties of incompatibilism.
3 CONSTRAINTS FORAFORMULATION
Let’s begin by laying down some constraints for the investigation to follow.
Given that we are attempting to formulate the thesis of source incompatibilism,
any adequate formulation must conform to two extremely natural constraints.
And, as we will see, all of the formulations given above, save one, violate at
least one of these constraints. The first constraint can be put as follows:
(C1) Source incompatibilism must be a variety or type of incompat-
ibilism.
This constraint needs to be spelled out in two ways. First, it requires that all
source incompatibilists be incompatibilists. That is, in order for someone to be
7 See also Timpe’s (2008) book on free will, especially ch. 1.
8 Elsewhere in his article, however, Timpe does seem to formulate the source incompatibilist view
more along the lines of (SI-4), with its explicit talk about fundamentality. See, for instance, p. 147.
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considered a source incompatibilist, she must accept that no deterministic
world contains morally responsible agents. That seems natural enough. It is,
after all, supposed to be a variety of incompatibilism.
But second, and more important, a proper formulation of source incompati-
bilism must not smuggle in any views that aren’t clearly relevant to the thesis of
incompatibilism. That is, for any formulation to count as adequate, it must only
take an official stand on views that are clearly relevant to the incompatibility of
determinism and moral responsibility. Incompatibilism is not, after all, a posi-
tive view about all the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsi-
bility—it is merely the view that determinism and moral responsibility are not
compossible. So any genuine type or variety of incompatibilism must stick to
the basics. It must not take a stand on any necessary or sufficient condition for
moral responsibility, unless the condition in question plays an essential role in
motivating incompatibilism. Types of incompatibilism should be individuated
by what condition for moral responsibility determinism supposedly rules out,
and not by any other conditions that aren’t relevant to the incompatibility of
determinism and moral responsibility. Any genuine variety of incompatibilism
will therefore need to fit the following schema: “Incompatibilism is true
because _________.”
To clarify (C1), consider the predicate ‘tall professor.’ This phrase does not
pick out a type or a variety of professor. It just combines two facts about some-
one—he is both tall and a professor. But these facts are, in an important sense,
independent of each other. One could, with equal propriety, say of the person in
question either that he is a tall professor or that he is both tall and a professor.
The term ‘source incompatibilism,’ on the other hand, should not function like
this. It shouldn’t be that a source incompatibilist is just someone who happens
to be both an incompatibilist and an adherent of some other independent thesis.9
Rather, it should function more like ‘associate professor’: the adjective modify-
ing ‘professor’ in this case is actually relevant to the noun it modifies. One
could not, with equal propriety, say of someone either that he is an associate
professor or that he is both associate and a professor. Indeed, the latter claim
doesn’t even seem to make sense. To be an associate professor is to be a partic-
ular sort of professor. Similarly, to be a source incompatibilist is to be a particu-
lar sort of incompatibilist.
It might be helpful to consider the following remarks from Peter van
Inwagen. About the terms ‘soft determinism,’ ‘hard determinism,’ and ‘libertar-
ianism,’ he says:
I object to these terms because they lump together theses that should
be discussed and analysed separately. Even having them on hand is a
permanent temptation to conflate [the problem of figuring out
whether determinism is true or whether we have free will] and [the
9 Though one may be correctly described as a materialist incompatibilist if one accepts both the
thesis of materialism and the thesis of incompatibilism, materialist incompatibilism is not a variety
or type of incompatibilism.
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problem of figuring out whether determinism is compatible with free
will]. They are therefore worse than useless and ought to be dropped
from the working vocabulary of philosophers. (van Inwagen 1983,
14)
These remarks seem quite sensible to me.10 And one could make similar
remarks if the philosophical community began to use the term ‘source incom-
patibilism’ to refer to the conjunction of two theses that ought to be discussed
and analyzed separately. Just as hard determinism is not, properly speaking, a
variety or type of determinism, so source incompatibilism, in this objectionable
sense, would not be a variety or type of incompatibilism. It would just be the
conjunction of incompatibilism with some other thesis.
So, (C1) mandates that source incompatibilism must be a type of incompati-
bilism. But a proper formulation of the thesis must also respect this second con-
straint:
(C2) Source incompatibilism must be concerned with sourcehood.
This constraint seems unobjectionable. Source incompatibilism is a type of
incompatibilism, and that which makes it a type of incompatibilism must have
something to do with this concept of sourcehood that is so important to all par-
ties in the debate.
4 SEARCHING FORAFORMULATION
There are five different formulations to consider. All but one of these formula-
tions, it turns out, violate at least one of our two constraints. Consider (SI-1):
(SI-1) Incompatibilism is true and (PAP) is false.
Anyone who endorsed (SI-1) would indeed endorse incompatibilism, since that
is the first conjunct of the formulation. However, the second conjunct is unre-
lated to incompatibilism per se. Recall that according to (PAP), an agent is
morally responsible for an action only if the agent is able to refrain from per-
forming that action. But what does the denial of (PAP) have to do with incom-
patibilism? Nothing at all. It’s not as if the denial of (PAP) will play the role of
a premise in some argument to the conclusion that determinism and moral
responsibility could not both be true (how could it?)11 To be sure, many incom-
patibilists will want to deny (PAP) when they attempt to provide a comprehen-
sive theory of moral responsibility, but the fact that they deny it is entirely
orthogonal to the fact that they are incompatibilists. So it looks like (SI-1) runs
10 In more recent work, van Inwagen has repeated this advice: “Although the terms ‘libertarianism,’
‘hard determinism,’ and ‘soft determinism’ are perfectly well defined, I very strongly recommend
that philosophers never use them—except, of course, when they are forced to because they are dis-
cussing the work of philosophers who have been imprudent enough to use them . . . . Writers on free
will who do not take my advice on this matter are continually saying things that they would be better
off not saying . . . ” (van Inwagen 2008, 331).
11 The affirmation of (PAP) may play this role, however, as it does for so-called leeway
incompatibilists, who are discussed below.
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afoul of (C1) and must therefore be rejected.
What of (SI-1)’s alleged advantage that it allows for a clean contrast with the
more traditional sort of incompatibilism that is motivated by (PAP) together
with the claim that determinism would rule out the ability to do otherwise? This
is not, in fact, an advantage. As will be seen in more detail below, this particular
contrast is unnecessary, and there’s no reason to think that it would be helpful.
If all one knows about some theorist is that she is an incompatibilist who denies
(PAP), one still doesn’t know anything about why she is an incompatibilist; at
best, one knows that she’s not one because of PAP. But how useful is that
knowledge?
Moreover, there is a worry that (SI-1) would tempt some theorists into think-
ing something false, namely that those who do endorse (PAP) aren’t worried
about any issues having to do with sourcehood. Just as incompatibilists don’t
have a monopoly on the concept of sourcehood, so theorists who deny (PAP)
don’t have such a monopoly either. Sourcehood will play a crucial role in any
plausible theory of moral responsibility, even if it is constructed by someone
who also happens to be a proponent of (PAP).12
Despite its growing currency in the literature, then, (SI-1) ought to be reject-
ed as an adequate formulation of source incompatibilism. What about (SI-2)?
(SI-2) Incompatibilism is true and (regardless of whether (PAP) is
true) the ability to refrain from doing X is not what plays the
most important role in explaining why A is responsible for
doing X—what plays the most important role is the causal
history of the action.
Like (SI-1), (SI-2) runs afoul of (C1). First, it states that incompatibilism is
true; that much is okay. But it then adds a claim about what plays a more impor-
tant explanatory role regarding moral responsibility. Even if it were clear what
it means for a certain set of conditions to play a more important explanatory
role, such a claim plays no straightforward role in motivating incompatibilism.
Again, how could it? To take a stand on what plays the most important role in
explaining why S is responsible for doing A is not to say anything about why
determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. It may be an interesting
bit of biographical information about the theorist in question, and it may be cru-
cial for understanding the theorist’s overall theory of moral responsibility, but
it’s certainly no part of the theorist’s incompatibilism, and so ought not to be
included in any definition of a variety of incompatibilism.13
One alleged advantage of (SI-2) is the fact that it has a parallel compatibilist
position, source compatibilism. But if source compatibilism is meant to be a
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12 Some of the remarks Kevin Timpe (2007) makes seem to indicate that he is being tempted by the
terminology to think that proponents of (PAP) are not concerned with sourcehood.
13 One might object here that a theorist who tells us what plays the more important explanatory role
when it comes to moral responsibility is also implicitly telling us why he is an incompatibilist—
because determinism rules out the set of conditions that play the most important explanatory role
when it comes to moral responsibility. Perhaps this is right, but the official formulation of source
incompatibilism ought not to rely on what’s being said implicitly.
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variety of compatibilism, a proper formulation of the thesis will have to respect
an analogous version of (C1) above for compatibilism. And the thesis of source
compatibilism, as understood by an analogue of (SI-2), will violate (C1) just as
(SI-2) does. So the fact that (SI-2) has a parallel formulation in terms of com-
patibilism is not an advantage after all.
Our first two formulations violate (C1), and thus are inadequate.14 What
about (SI-3)?
(SI-3) Incompatibilism is true, but not because determinism rules
out the ability to do otherwise.
It should be immediately clear that (SI-3) won’t work because it violates (C2).
According to (C2), any adequate formulation of source incompatibilism must
employ the notion of sourcehood. But such a notion is nowhere to be seen in
(SI-3). Moreover, this formulation violates (C1) as well, since it fails to specify
a particular type of incompatibilism. It is certainly an incompatibilist thesis in
the sense that anyone who accepted it would automatically count as an incom-
patibilist, but it fails to say anything in particular about what sort of incompati-
bilist thesis it is. It states what sort of incompatibilist thesis it’s not—but it
doesn’t provide anything positive that is relevant to incompatibilism.
One might at first think that by telling us what sort of incompatibilist thesis
it’s not it thereby tells us what sort it is, since there are only two sorts: source
and leeway. But, as hinted above and as explained in more detail below, an ade-
quate formulation of source incompatibilism will leave open the possibility of
other sorts of incompatibilism besides the familiar source and leeway varieties.
For instance, some theorists are incompatibilists because they endorse some
sort of transfer of non-responsibility principle. Such an argument certainly has
incompatibilism as its conclusion, but nowhere does it mention either the abili-
ty to do otherwise or anything about sourcehood. So such a position should not
be counted as a source incompatibilist position (or a leeway incompatibilist
position either, as we will see below), at least on the conceptual scheme argued
for here. Source incompatibilism must be a thesis about sourcehood.15
(SI-3) fails to respect the constraints, so let’s continue our search for a formu-
lation. Next, consider (SI-4):
(SI-4) Incompatibilism is true, and the fundamental reason it is true
is that determinism rules out origination—not that determin-
ism rules out the ability to do otherwise.
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14 For what it’s worth, (SI-1) also violates (C2) since it says nothing about sourcehood. (SI-2), on the
other hand, talks about the causal history of an action, which may well be cashed out in terms of
sourcehood.
15 So, even Joseph Campbell’s new name for his paper (see note 5 above) that uses the term ‘Direct
Source Incompatibilism’ (emphasis added) will not do. Endorsing a “direct” argument for
incompatibilism (that goes via the transfer of non-responsibility principle) is not enough to be
counted as a source incompatibilist. At least, not according to the conceptual scheme of this paper.
To be sure, someone might attempt to justify the validity of the relevant transfer principle by talking
in terms of sourcehood, but a clean taxonomy should not automatically commit proponents of
transfer principles to source incompatibilism, a label they may or may not feel is appropriate.
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This formulation gets closer than the first three did. No mention is made here of
(PAP), and the focus is on a reason why incompatibilism is true. This all seems
promising. But (SI-4) still says more than a formulation of source incompatibil-
ism ought to say. In particular, it points out two different reasons one might
think that incompatibilism is true, and takes a stand on which of those two rea-
sons is more fundamental. But even if it were clear what it means for one reason
to be more fundamental than another, there’s no reason to make source incom-
patibilists by definition committed to any claim about fundamentality.16 In fact,
claims about fundamentality would seem to violate (C1). What’s really doing
the work in (SI-4) to motivate incompatibilism is the claim about sourcehood
(put here in terms of origination); the claim about fundamentality doesn’t seem
to make a relevant difference to incompatibilism per se. So let’s drop the claim
about fundamentality and retain the basic flavor of (SI-4), which is that the rea-
son incompatibilism is true is that determinism rules out sourcehood.
Making this small amendment to (SI-4) brings us to the way that (SI-5) was
formulated above:
(SI-5) Incompatibilism is true because determinism rules out
sourcehood, which is required for moral responsibility.
This formulation is straightforward and, more importantly, it respects both con-
straints. Consider (C1) first. As with all the other formulations, anyone who
accepted (SI-5) would be an incompatibilist. (SI-5) also specifies a certain type
of incompatibilism insofar as it identifies a particular reason for thinking that
the incompatibilist thesis is true. It fits the schema specified in section 3 above,
namely, “Incompatibilism is true because _________.”
Now consider (C2). The problem with (SI-3) was that it didn’t talk about
sourcehood at all, but this is clearly not a problem with (SI-5). The argument for
incompatibilism that it endorses refers to sourcehood. Thus it appears that (SI-
5) respects both constraints, and should indeed be considered an adequate for-
mulation of source incompatibilism. But this isn’t merely an adequate
formulation; if any thesis ought to be called ‘source incompatibilism,’ this is it.
It may not look a whole lot different than the other candidate formulations we
have considered, but in the rest of this paper, I try to clarify its differences and
point out its conceptual advantages.
5 REFINING THE FORMULATION
To ensure clarity about (SI-5), it will be helpful to look at the distinction
between sourcehood and ultimate sourcehood. In the passage from Kevin
Timpe cited above as the inspiration for (SI-5), he uses the term ‘ultimate
sourcehood’ instead of the simpler ‘sourcehood.’ These two notions are often
conflated due to the same accidents of history that have made sourcehood seem
like a purely incompatibilist idea.17 But—and here’s the important point—
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16 Leon and Tognazzini’s (2010, 564-565) work contains a suggestion about how to understand talk
of fundamentality as it is invoked in certain formulations of source incompatibilism.
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source incompatibilists need not think that sourcehood requires ultimacy.18 For
example, someone might hold that the sort of sourcehood required for moral
responsibility is just some sort of hierarchical structure of endorsement à la
Harry Frankfurt, but this theorist may nevertheless think that if determinism is
true, such a structure cannot exist.19 Such a position should (and, on the pro-
posed taxonomy of this paper, would) count as a source incompatibilist posi-
tion. Perhaps no one in particular holds this position, but a clean taxonomy
should surely make room for it, and there would be no room for such a position
without a clean distinction between sourcehood and ultimate sourcehood.
That said, however, it does seem to be true that most source incompatibilists
think that sourcehood requires something like ultimate sourcehood. It will be
useful, then, to have a name for their position. Instead of ‘source incompatibil-
ism,’ though, which is more general, let us use ‘ultimacy incompatibilism.’This
view can be formulated as follows:
Ultimacy Incompatibilism (UI) Incompatibilism is true because
determinism rules out ultimacy,
which is required for sourcehood,
which is required for moral respon-
sibility.
Formulating the view in this way makes it clear how (UI) fits together with
source incompatibilism in general. (UI) is a particular version of source incom-
patibilism.
6 IMPLICATIONS
If the terrain is mapped as suggested above, a few notable results emerge. First,
there are various versions of source incompatibilism, including ultimacy
incompatibilism. Second, there will be incompatibilists who endorse neither
source incompatibilism nor ultimacy incompatibilism. These will be theorists
who endorse some other argument for incompatibilism—perhaps one that takes
(PAP) as a premise (more on this view below). And finally, the different vari-
eties of incompatibilism are not exclusive. That is, someone may be both a
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17 For example, as more philosophers (particularly incompatibilists) were persuaded by the so-called
Frankfurt-examples (Frankfurt 1969), it became necessary for PAP-denying incompatibilists to
distinguish themselves from more traditional incompatibilists. They latched onto the concept of
sourcehood as a way to do this, and at the same time their commitment to a type of ultimacy was
imported into the concept as well.
18 I use the term ‘ultimacy’ to mark the generally incompatibilist idea that moral responsibility
requires some relatively extreme sort of control that is typically missing from compatibilist
accounts, but of course compatibilists may well find that use of the term tendentious. (Thanks to
Patrick Todd for helping me to see this point.) This is a fair point, but for my purposes nothing hangs
on the precise word we use here. We could call it ‘super-duper ultimacy’ if that would help.
19 Although Frankfurt’s view of moral responsibility is certainly amenable to a compatibilist line, it’s
unclear whether Frankfurt himself is a compatibilist. Indeed, some of what Frankfurt says makes it
seem as though he is reserving the right to be a source incompatibilist of some “non-ultimacy”
variety (Frankfurt 2002, 29). But there are also places where Frankfurt seems to assert the
compatibilist thesis more clearly (e.g., Frankfurt 2006, 16).
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source incompatibilist and an ultimacy incompatibilist (in fact, being the latter
entails being the former), and perhaps some other sort of incompatibilist as
well. A brief remark on each of these results is in order.
First, it seems right that there should be more than one way to be a source
incompatibilist, given how broad the concept of sourcehood is. Consider, for
instance, three theorists who should all be considered source incompatibilists:
Galen Strawson, Derk Pereboom, and Robert Kane. Each thinks that determin-
ism rules out sourcehood, but each has a different conception of sourcehood.
Strawson (1986) thinks sourcehood requires some sort of impossible self-cre-
ation, Pereboom (2001) thinks sourcehood amounts to (at least) a lack of deter-
mination by factors beyond one’s control and perhaps the presence of some sort
of agent-causation, and Kane (1996) thinks that sourcehood is a matter of an
agent’s being responsible for the sufficient causes of his action (or something
close to this). But these three theorists share something in common: they focus
their incompatibilism on the worry that determinism poses to sourcehood. They
should thus all count as source incompatibilists. And this is true despite the fact
that they take different stands on (PAP) and other issues having to do with what
else is required for moral responsibility. Again, these other issues will be part of
a theorist’s positive theory, but they form no part of the theorist’s incompatibil-
ism per se.20
Second, there will be incompatibilists who are neither source nor ultimacy
incompatibilists in the above senses of the terms. Consider an incompatibilist
who maintains the following view:
Leeway Incompatibilism (LI) Incompatibilism is true because deter-
minism rules out the ability to do oth-
erwise, which is required for moral
responsibility.
A leeway incompatibilist need endorse neither source incompatibilism nor ulti-
macy incompatibilism. Such a theorist might think that if, per impossibile,
determinism did not rule out the ability to do otherwise, it would then pose no
threat at all to sourcehood or to moral responsibility. The only thing that moti-
vates this theorist’s incompatibilism is the idea that determinism would rule out
the ability to do otherwise. So the above formulation of source incompatibilism
leaves open plenty of room for those that have traditionally been called ‘leeway
incompatibilists.’21
But notice that according to our favored formulations of (LI), (SI), and (UI),
the views are not exclusive. There’s no reason at all why a leeway incompati-
bilist could not also be a source incompatibilist. Such a theorist will think that
Understanding Source Incompatibilism 85
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
20 As a matter of fact, Strawson, Pereboom, and Kane would all count as ultimacy incompatibilists,
since the sort of sourcehood they think is required for moral responsibility involves some stringent
sort of ultimacy condition. But, as was pointed out above, ultimacy incompatibilism should not be
identified with source incompatibilism, since there certainly seems to be logical room for an
incompatibilist view that takes sourcehood seriously while denying the need for ultimacy.
21 Why might someone be worried about the threat determinism poses to the ability to do otherwise
but not be worried about its implications for sourcehood? Consider the standard argument for the
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there are two reasons determinism is threatening to moral responsibility. First, it
rules out the ability to do otherwise. And moreover, it rules out sourcehood.22
Here the proposed taxonomy makes a significant split from the traditional
way of dividing up the incompatibilist territory. Traditionally, one cannot be
both a leeway incompatibilist and a source incompatibilist. But this dichotomy
usually results from the addition of clauses in the formulation of one or both
views that directly violate one of the constraints laid down at the beginning of
our investigation. So, for instance, if the formulation talks about what is “more
fundamental” or what “plays a more important explanatory role”, then (LI) and
(SI) will turn out to be mutually exclusive. But, as argued above, there is reason
not to include such talk in a proper formulation of either thesis. And once such
phrases are banished from a proper formulation, the exclusivity disappears, as
well. This is no bad thing: why shouldn’t it be possible to endorse more than
one route to incompatibilism? At the very least, this possibility shouldn’t be
ruled out by definition.
7 OBJECTIONS
Before concluding, a couple of objections to the taxonomy offered here should
be addressed. First, someone might object that the formulation of source incom-
patibilism offered above—(SI-5)—is too broad to be useful, since it includes
most, and quite possibly all, incompatibilists. To the charge that all incompati-
bilists will count as source incompatibilists on the above taxonomy, the plea is
not guilty. Incompatibilists who think that determinism does not rule out source-
hood will not count as source incompatibilists. Perhaps the only problem with
determinism, according to such a theorist, is that it robs us of the ability to do
otherwise. Mere lack of this ability, however, need not imply lack of source-
hood.23 As to the charge that most incompatibilists will count as source incom-
patibilists on the above taxonomy, the plea is guilty, but why is this a problem?
Source incompatibilism is an incredibly plausible version of incompatibilism.
Moreover, there will still be the distinction, even among source incompatibilists,
between those who are also leeway incompatibilists and those who aren’t, as
well as other similar distinctions between other varieties of incompatibilism.
This last point leads to the next objection, which is that the above taxonomy
eliminates the useful contrast between source incompatibilism and leeway
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incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom (Pike 1965). This argument purports
to show that divine foreknowledge (of a certain sort) is incompatible with the ability to do other-
wise, but the argument seems to have no implications whatever for the issue of sourcehood. So, it’s
surely possible to be a leeway incompatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility without
thinking that determinism would also rule out sourcehood. (Conversely, it’s possible to be worried
about the implications of determinism for sourcehood without being worried about its implications
for the ability to do otherwise, even while accepting the truth of (PAP).)
22 Indeed, Robert Kane is a theorist who endorses (LI), (SI), and (UI).
23 See footnote 21. Alternatively, it may be that most actual theorists who worry about the ability to
do otherwise are worried precisely because they think that sourcehood requires such an ability. It’s
unclear how to judge this possibility, but in any case, all that’s needed for the purposes of this paper
is that theorists who worry about the ability to do otherwise need not have any worries about
sourcehood.
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incompatibilism. If one adopts the taxonomy of this paper, one can no longer
conclude ~(LI) from (SI) or vice versa. While this is true, it seems unproblem-
atic. Indeed, I argued above that the only reason (SI) and (LI) were thought to
be mutually exclusive was that extraneous claims were being smuggled into
formulations of the two views. (SI) should not include the claim, for example,
that (PAP) is false, since that claim has nothing to do with incompatibilism per
se. Once talk about (PAP) is excluded from a proper formulation of (SI), how-
ever, the dichotomy between (SI) and (LI) disappears. Far from being an
unwanted consequence, however, this provides a clearer picture of the incom-
patibilist neighborhood. Any particular variety of incompatibilism provides a
reason why one might think that determinism and moral responsibility could
not obtain in the same world, and there very well could be more than one reason
to think that.
8 CONCLUSION
Source incompatibilism is misunderstood. This paper is an attempt to get clear
on just how this thesis should be formulated, and on how it differs from neigh-
boring theses, such as leeway incompatibilism and ultimacy incompatibilism.
Dividing up the terrain in the way suggested above has three chief virtues:
(1) It respects the constraint that any sort of incompatibilism should
be a genuine type of incompatibilism that specifically references
why the incompatibilist thesis is true. In so doing, it respects the
difference between reasons why a theorist might accept incom-
patibilism and further positive conditions a theorist might put on
moral responsibility.
(2) It shows that the different incompatibilist positions are not
mutually exclusive. One can be both a leeway incompatibilist
and a source incompatibilist, and perhaps other types of incom-
patibilist as well (such as a Transfer-of-Non-Responsibility
incompatibilist, for instance).
(3) It clearly brings out the fact that all theorists agree that moral
responsibility requires some notion of sourcehood.
I have not provided any arguments either in favor of or against source incom-
patibilism. Rather, the project was to discover the most conceptually perspicu-
ous formulation of the thesis. To the extent that the project has succeeded,
theorists of all stripes will be in a better position to begin serious investigation
into the pressing question of whether source incompatibilism is true.24
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24 For helpful conversations about and comments on this essay, thanks to John Martin Fischer, Paul
Hoffman, Michael Nelson, Kevin Timpe, Patrick Todd, and Gary Watson.
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